# Tech & Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM) serves as an escalation channel for journalism organisations to engage with tech platforms in order to address and resolve account-related
Currently in its pilot stage, the **Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM)** has been established as a platform for trusted and verified independent news media organisations to report account-related incidents and ongoing issues with prominent tech platforms. This mechanism is primarily **designed to address account-related incidents and issues**, such as: {% hint style="warning" %} Account removal, suspensions and denial of service {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} Mislabelling, deamplification and monetisation restrictions {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} Repeated content moderation and other account-related disputes {% endhint %} It’s important to note that participation in **this mechanism is voluntary** and that there is no guarantee that reported issues and appeals will be successfully resolved. ## How to submit a case {% hint style="success" %} If you believe that your account is experiencing any of the issues outlined above, we encourage you to [submit your information using this form](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/submit-your-case). {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} ## The process in 7 steps
## Tools and resources While you wait for our response please consult the tools resources that are available for you from:. {% content-ref url="/pages/FY5P0SVJnA4ToWx02QhE" %} [Tech platforms](/tools-resources/tech-platforms) {% endcontent-ref %} {% content-ref url="/pages/d1mZT8EfdSKEbpwriccP" %} [Civil society](/tools-resources/civil-society) {% endcontent-ref %} ## About the mechanism Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM) acts as a forum where all stakeholders, journalism organisations, civil society organisations, companies and states can discuss, develop recommendations and adopt crisis and emergency protocols for journalism orgnanisations, and share best practices in transparency reporting and account moderation of journalism and media organisations in the digital space. It uses a voluntary-compliance approach where all stakeholders sign up to a model that does not create legal obligations and where they voluntarily implement the T\&JM’s recommendations. The T\&JM is a multi-stakeholder process where representatives of the different interested groups come together to improve the practices of the sector. The mechanism should involve and should be led by local and regional actors. {% content-ref url="/pages/1kBVmvSAHfP4P7JFHek2" %} [Terms of Reference](/policies/terms-of-reference) {% endcontent-ref %} ### **Cross-industry collaboration** {% hint style="success" %} Engage a leading group of local and regional organisations representing professional communities of ethical journalism organisations, digital and journalism experts, academics as well as technology companies, and facilitate multi-stakeholder conversations. {% endhint %} ### **Solutions** {% hint style="success" %} Private sector companies, journalists, media and their professional communities, academics, experts, international multilateral organisations and civil society collaborate to share best practices as they develop and implement new solutions through a joint cross-industry mechanism. {% endhint %} ### **Civil society engagement and empowerment** {% hint style="success" %} Empowers journalism and media communities to participate in policy forums in order to support and promote journalism as a public good. The mechanism involves and is led by local and regional actors. It also links the initiative with international and regional players to collect data, advocate, monitor policies, and supervise the proper functioning of the mechanism. {% endhint %} ### **Knowledge, data sharing and transparency** {% hint style="success" %} We work towards the goal that no knowledge and insights are lost, and that experiences and lessons learned at all levels are collected and processed – from global to local, directly from the field as well as in academia. {% endhint %} # Coalition, partners, & experts Partners of the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism include representatives from journalism organisations, civil society, academia, and experts in digital media and policy. We seek to cooperate with other mechanisms and initiatives to collectively enhance the protection and support for media entities across digital platforms. {% content-ref url="/pages/tzXcxak0LvDHrhhVs0hl" %} [Ukraine coalition](/coalition-partners-experts/ukraine-coalition) {% endcontent-ref %} {% content-ref url="/pages/3q7wL93mRi81uJ6YXd2j" %} [International partners & experts](/coalition-partners-experts/international-partners-and-experts) {% endcontent-ref %} # Ukraine coalition The Ukrainian Coalition of the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM) is a collaborative initiative formed by a diverse group of Ukrainian organizations. The coalition is dedicated to addressing and mitigating cases where journalists and media organizations face systemic issues on various tech platforms. ## Members of the Ukrainian Coalition of the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM): 1. [**Lviv Media Forum:** ](https://lvivmediaforum.com/en)Lviv Media Forum is an ecosystem of people, organizations and projects that develops comprehensive media solutions and promotes the best global media practices in Ukraine. We work to make Ukrainian media viable — professional, ethical and capable. 2. [**Center for Democracy and Rule of Law**](https://cedem.org.ua/en/)**:** 3. [**Institute of Mass Information**](https://imi.org.ua/en)**:** IMI is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization, which has been working in the public sector since 1995 and implementing projects aimed at boosting positive impact of media on establishment of the civil society in Ukraine. 4. [**Detector Media**](https://detector.media/)**:** Detector Media enhances resilience to disinformation, promotes media freedom and empowers quality journalism. 5. [**Civil Network "Opora"**](https://www.oporaua.org/en)**:** They are dedicated to public oversight in elections, parliamentarism, education, energy efficiency, and open data aiming for impactful institutional reforms. 6. [**StopFake:**](https://www.stopfake.org/ru/glavnaya-2/) They are an educational platform and aim at implementing high standards of journalism education in Ukraine, raise the level of media literacy, inform about the danger of propaganda and dissemination of fake information in the media. 7. [**Media Development Foundation:** ](https://mediadevelopmentfoundation.org/)MDF offer media accelerators and courses to empower independent media with skills, tech innovations, and strategic connections for sustainability, fostering a robust ecosystem with ethical journalism standards. 8. [**Digital Security Lab Ukraine:**](https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/organization/digital-security-lab-ukraine-dslu) provides digital security assistance to human rights defenders, independent media and other non-profit organizations and aims at creating a human-rights-centered digital environment in Ukraine by contributing to policy development in the area of Internet governance, media regulation and AI. 9. [**Internews Ukraine**](https://internews.ua/)**:** Internews Ukraine is an organization that has expertise in media, communications, education, and consulting. Innovation, professionalism, and efficiency are three pillars of their organization. 10. [**Commission on Journalists Ethics:**](https://cje.org.ua/en/about/) They are a self-regulation body for the work of journalists and newsrooms in Ukraine, which discusses and proposes resolutions to situations of conflict in the media by considering complaints from information consumers. ### **Roles and responsibilities** The [T\&JM Ukraine Coalition](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/master/t-and-jm-team-and-partners/ukraine-coalition), coordinated by the Lviv Media Forum, plays a pivotal role in the operational framework of the T\&JM. This coalition is instrumental in identifying and assessing media entities that could benefit from the escalation channel, ensuring that the process aligns with the needs and challenges specific to the Ukrainian media landscape. Dedicated to safeguarding journalists and media organizations from targeted actions on tech platforms, the Ukrainian Coalition plays a pivotal role in the development of the mechanism such as: {% hint style="success" %} **Assessment and recognition**: Actively participate in recognising and assessing media outlets and journalists who may benefit from T\&JM’s escalation services, ensuring a fair and comprehensive evaluation process. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Regular engagement:** Attend and contribute to regular meetings and communication channels to stay informed and aligned with T\&JM’s evolving strategies and policies. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Development contribution:** Play an integral role in shaping the development of T\&JM’s objectives, especially in crafting and fine-tuning the criteria and protocols that govern the assessment and verification processes. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Collaborative drafting:** Collaborate in drafting and refining identification criteria, protocols, and mechanisms, bringing in unique insights from the Ukrainian context. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Advocacy and representation**: Advocate for the implementation of T\&JM’s recommendations within their respective organisations and broader professional networks, fostering a supportive environment for the mechanism’s goals and activities. {% endhint %} ### Supervision and governance The coalition's activities will be supervised by an advisory board, managed by the Lviv Media Forum (LMF). Regular reviews every six months will ensure the coalition remains responsive and effective in addressing challenges faced by journalists and media organizations on tech platforms. By uniting these organizations, the Ukrainian Coalition aims to provide a comprehensive and collaborative approach to safeguarding journalistic integrity and protecting media organizations from facing systemic issues with technology platforms. # International partners & experts In collaboration with international partners and experts, our initiative brings together a global network of professionals who contribute invaluable expertise and experience. Their collective efforts play a pivotal role in advancing our critical mission. The process of developing the Tech and Journalism Mechanism is multistakeholder and consultative, with the mission of being locally driven and empowering local actors. ### Partners and experts More than 30 organisations and institutions contributed to the shaping of this initiative, including through consultations in [Riga](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/about/about-t-and-jm/consultations/consultation-report-25-jan-2023-riga-latvia) and [Paris](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/about/about-t-and-jm/consultations/consultation-report-21-feb-2023-paris-france). T\&JM partners and experts include: * Daniel Bedoya Arroyo ([Access Now](https://www.accessnow.org/)) * Thibaut Bruttin and Bertrand Mossiat ([Journalism Trust Initiative/](https://rsf.org/en/journalism-trust-initiative)[Reporters Without Borders)](https://rsf.org/en) * Zoey Barthelemy ([Internews](https://internews.org/)) * Bojana Kostic (Consultant) * Ruth Kronenburgh ([Free Press Unlimited](https://www.freepressunlimited.org)) * Courtney C. Radsch ([Open Markets Institute](https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/)) * Charles Turner ([OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/)) * Elodie Vialle ([Pen America](https://pen.org/)) * Joanna Szymanska ([Article 19](http://www.article19.org/)) * Michael J. Oghia (Consultant) * Lea Auffarth ([Global Media Registry](https://www.mediaregistry.org/)) * Olaf Steenfadt ([Global Media Registry](https://www.mediaregistry.org/)) The Tech and Journalism Mechanism initiative is supported by the [Open Society Foundations](https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/). ### Objectives Working collaboratively, our international partners and experts share their input from a range of perspectives to ensure the following: {% hint style="success" %} **Global Perspective:** Infuse diverse perspectives into our initiatives, drawing on a wealth of global experience. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Strategic Guidance:** Provide strategic guidance and insights to enhance the effectiveness of our programs and projects. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Knowledge Exchange:** Facilitate knowledge exchange to ensure continuous learning and adaptation to emerging challenges. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Best Practices:** Introducing international best practices to elevate the impact and sustainability of our initiatives. {% endhint %} Our collaboration with international partners and experts has significantly enriched the Tech and Journalism Emergency Crisis initiative. By fostering a diverse and global perspective, we fortify our efforts with a wealth of insights and experiences and we value the contributions that sustain the Tech & Journalism Mechanism. # ++ SUBMIT YOUR CASE ++ {% embed url="" %} # Tech platforms Explore a set of resources from Meta, TikTok and YouTube and discover the latest guidelines, updates and support systems available for you. ## Meta's Resources: Discover the latest updates, Guidelines and support from Meta to help address content or account related issues effectively. You will find relevant sources on content moderation, Meta's Oversight Board, safety programes and more. Explore Meta's resources [here.](/tools-resources/tech-platforms/meta) {% content-ref url="/pages/KZ0ku126NuzYKw4QXBxC" %} [Meta](/tools-resources/tech-platforms/meta) {% endcontent-ref %} ## **TikTok's Resources:** Navigate TikTok's Community Guidelines and enforcement measures to ensure safety for users. The page details enforcement policies, including exceptions for public interest content, moderation procedures, and user-friendly processes for appeals and notifications related to content violations or account issues. Explore TikTok's resources [here](/tools-resources/tech-platforms/tiktok). {% content-ref url="/pages/QlIdK816Xm8TeBs8mqbW" %} [TikTok](/tools-resources/tech-platforms/tiktok) {% endcontent-ref %} ## YouTube's Resources: Delve into the YouTube's set of tools, and insights including YouTube's Partner Program, Help Center and community forum to assist users and media organizations in addressing account or content related issues. Explore YouTube's resources [here](/tools-resources/tech-platforms/youtube). {% content-ref url="/pages/AyNdxZvNl0hcMxBluvuK" %} [YouTube](/tools-resources/tech-platforms/youtube) {% endcontent-ref %} ### # Meta While you wait for our response please consult some of Meta's resources that are available for you.
### **Content Moderation** [Facebook Community Standards Education for Media Partners](https://www.facebookblueprint.com/student/path/219724-facebook-community-standards-education-for-media-partners?fbclid=IwAR1_0MZOww0IfEVPYCcmcbHRI-w66y38Ximtrn2HEWAz6ZY-jzNG9YLQ46o) program can help you learn more about our Community Standards and other policies to help publishers conform to our policies and avoid violations. The [Transparency Centre](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/policies/) also outlines in detail each of the Community Standards that apply to Facebook and Instagram. If you post content that goes against the Facebook Community Standards or Instagram Community Guidelines, we'll remove it and may then apply a strike to your Facebook or Instagram account. Whether we apply a strike depends on the severity of the content, the context in which it was shared and when it was posted. You can learn more about the strike system [here](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/enforcement/taking-action/counting-strikes/). For most violations on Facebook, strikes will lead to the following restrictions: * **One strike:** You'll get a warning as this is your first strike. * **Two to six strikes:** You'll be restricted from some features, such as posting in groups, for a limited amount of time. * **Seven strikes:** You'll get a 1-day restriction from creating content, which includes posting, commenting, creating a Page and more. * **Eight strikes:** You'll get a 3-day restriction from creating content. * **Nine strikes:** You'll get a 7-day restriction from creating content. * **Ten or more strikes:** You’ll get a 30-day restriction from creating content. {% hint style="info" %} You can check your [**Facebook**'s account status here](https://www.facebook.com/profile_status) {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} Group Quality is a tool for understanding content in your group that has been flagged or removed by **Facebook**. [**Find out how to use Group Quality**](https://www.facebook.com/community/using-key-groups-tools/understanding-group-quality/) to get a snapshot of violating content in your group. {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} Information on how to access your [account status on **Instagram** can be found in this link](https://help.instagram.com/338481628002750/?cms_platform=android-app\&helpref=platform_switcher). {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} If you're having trouble logging into your account, review these tips and known login issues. [Recover your **Facebook** Account ](https://www.facebook.com/help/105487009541643)if you can't log in. {% endhint %} ### **Content Ranking** The ranking of posts, either higher or lower in a feed, is affected by predictions about the post, features of the content, and attributes of individuals and their interactions with Meta's products. For example, Facebook Feed uses the following process: 1. **Gather inventory**: The system gathers all potential posts shared by friends, Pages you follow and groups you've joined, which excludes posts flagged for going against our Community Standards. 2. **Leverage signals**: Next, the AI system considers a variety of input signals such as who created the post and how you previously interacted with them, whether the post is a photo, a video or a link, or how many of your friends liked the post. A lightweight model is run to select approximately 500 of the most relevant posts. The system also applies certain integrity processes to help reduce the distribution of problematic content. 3. **Make predictions**: From there, the AI system has models that help it make predictions about content that you'll find most relevant and valuable. 4. **Rank posts by score**: Finally, the system calculates a relevance score for about 500 posts and puts them in order by this score. Posts that the system predicts will provide more value for you are shown higher in your Feed. The system also tries to ensure that your Feed has a balanced mix of content types. This means, for example, that you wouldn't see multiple video posts in a row, but rather a variety of post types. You can learn more about how ranking works on different surfaces on Facebook and Instagram [here](https://transparency.fb.com/features/explaining-ranking/). For Instagram specific insights on how content gets recommended, see [here](https://creators.instagram.com/blog/instagram-recommendations-eligibility-tips-creators?locale=en_GB). We provide other insights on ways to grow your audience on our platforms [here](https://www.facebook.com/formedia/goals/grow-and-engage-your-audience#tab2). ### Safety The first port of call should be the [Meta Safety Center](https://about.meta.com/actions/safety/) and the [Journalist Safety Hub](https://www.facebook.com/formedia/mjp/journalist-safety-online#). For a consolidated overview on staying safe there is the [Digital Safety Guide For Journalists](https://scontent-lhr8-2.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t39.8562-6/309530751_2052275951648419_4834945332073293530_n.pdf?_nc_cat=105\&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=b8d81d&_nc_ohc=vJGKzwt03qcAX-rFlYB&_nc_ht=scontent-lhr8-2.xx\&oh=00_AfBeNjKohefLWtVkH9-b5uUoxoa087Y0OYRcB_XGk8oqKQ\&oe=64DFDCEC), which covers information such as what to do if you’ve been hacked and how to report abusive content. ### Additional safety programs [News Page Registration](https://www.facebook.com/formedia/tools/news-page-registration?locale=en_GB) is a voluntary process by which you can apply to have your Facebook Page registered as news. In order to be eligible for inclusion, Pages must be active in the last 90 days, must have existed for at least 90 days and must link to a functioning website with a verified domain. The program is available to publishers who operate in one of 42 supported languages and you can register [here](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/316333835842972?id=644465919618833). [Journalist Registration](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/620369758565492?id=1843027572514562) is a voluntary program specific to staff journalists and freelancers. The program provides security features that further protect journalists’ Facebook and Instagram accounts, and may provide other benefits for eligible users, such as Blue Badge verification. The program is available in 38 countries and you can register [here](https://www.facebook.com/journalist_registration). Individuals based outside of these countries may be eligible for our other safety programs. [Facebook Protect](https://www.facebook.com/help/1052552578831700) is a security program that helps secure people who might be at a higher risk of being targeted online. These groups include human rights defenders, journalists and elected officials. People who are eligible for Facebook Protect will see prompts on Facebook to learn about the programme and enroll. [Secondary Review](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/enforcement/detecting-violations/reviewing-high-visibility-content-accurately/), previously known as CrossCheck, is a system by which contract reviewers and people from our regions team perform a secondary review of content and entities that may violate our policies before an enforcement action is taken. To determine which content or entities receive ERSR, we maintain lists of users and entities, with responsibility for determining that list currently sitting within our global operations organization, with support from our legal and partnerships teams. ### The Oversight Board The [Oversight Board](https://www.oversightboard.com/) board is an external body that people can appeal to if they disagree with Meta’s content enforcement decisions on Facebook or Instagram. We’re committed to implementing the board’s content decisions, and their recommendations help shape how we govern our policies. Find more information on appeal procedures [here](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/oversight/appealing-to-oversight-board/). ### Cross-Check System Meta has implemented the cross-check system to address the challenge of incorrect content moderation. This system provides additional levels of review for flagged content, aiming to minimise high-risk false-positive errors by considering factors like nuance and context. The cross-check system is applied to various content, including that on Facebook and Instagram, and uses the same Community Standards for review. It plays a crucial role in protecting human rights by including entities such as journalists reporting from conflict zones and community leaders addressing hate or violence. The reviews consider context to ensure accurate action on the content, and they also extend to civic entities, providing users with insight into their leaders' statements. Find more information [here](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/enforcement/detecting-violations/reviewing-high-visibility-content-accurately/). ### Whatsapp Proxy WhatsApp proxy server is an intermediary gateway between WhatsApp and external servers. The proxy allows secure but indirect access to WhatsApp while maintaining the high level of privacy and security that WhatsApp provides as your personal messages will still be protected by end-to-end encryption. This is particularly useful in situations in which your internet connection is blocked or disrupted. If you have the ability to help others connect, you can learn how to set up a proxy [here.](https://faq.whatsapp.com/1299035810920553) You can learn how to set up and access the proxy feature [here](https://faq.whatsapp.com/1299035810920553) and [here.](https://faq.whatsapp.com/520504143274092) More information in keeping yourself and your community safe on WhatsApp, including how to report, can be found [here](https://www.whatsapp.com/security). \
# TikTok While you wait for our response please consult some of TikTok's resources that are available for you.
### Enforcement policies [This page](https://www.tiktok.com/community-guidelines/en/enforcement/) outlines TikTok's policy on public interest exceptions, content moderation, and the process of detection, reporting, notice, and appeals. It explains that certain content, falling under categories such as: **Documentary Educational, Medical and Scientific, Counterspeech, Satirical,** and **Artistic**, may be allowed on the platform due to its public interest nature. The page includes TikTok's efforts to remove or review content that violates guidelines before it is widely viewed, and the procedures for reporting violations. Additionally, the page emphasizes transparency in enforcement through the [**Transparency Center**](https://www.tiktok.com/transparency/) and outlines the notification and appeals process for users who violate rules. If you receive a notification of a content violation or account ban and believe that it was done in error, then you can [**appeal the decision**](https://support.tiktok.com/en/safety-hc/account-and-user-safety/content-violations-and-bans#4)**.** You can view the [**status of your appeal**](https://support.tiktok.com/en/safety-hc/account-and-user-safety/content-violations-and-bans) in the in-app Safety Center, as well as the status of any reports you have filed about other content or accounts. {% hint style="info" %} [Here you can find general information](https://support.tiktok.com/en/safety-hc/account-and-user-safety/account-safety) regarding account security and verification process in TikTok. {% endhint %} {% hint style="danger" %} To report a problem in Tiktok you can follow these steps: 1. In the TikTok app, tap Profile at the bottom. 2. Tap the Menu ☰ button at the top. 3. Tap Settings and privacy. 4. Tap Report a problem and select a topic. 5. Follow the steps in the app to fix the problem. If the suggested steps don't fix your problem, select No to the question "Is your problem resolved?", then tap Need more help? to contact us with further details. {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} If you don’t have access to your account you can [report a problem visiting this link](https://www.tiktok.com/legal/report/feedback). {% endhint %} # YouTube While you wait for our response please consult some of YouTube's resources that are available for you.
### YouTube Partner Program YouTube is expanding the [YouTube Partner Program](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/72851?hl) (YPP), offering earlier access to fan funding and Shopping features for eligible creators in select countries. The initiative aims to assist media support organizations and journalists in regaining account or content access. Eligibility is determined by meeting subscriber and watch hour thresholds, adhering to policies, and residing in an eligible country. Once eligible, creators can apply for features like Watch Page Ads, Shorts Feed Ads, and more. The review process takes about a month, and creators are encouraged to stay active for continued eligibility. [FAQs](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9235997) and support options are available through [YouTube's Help Center](https://support.google.com/youtube/topic/11407695) and community forums. ### Community Guidelines strike basics on YouTube This article explains YouTube's [Community Guidelines strike basics](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802032). These guidelines apply to all content on the platform. When a strike occurs, creators are notified via email, detailing the removed content, violated policies, and the impact on the channel. The first violation usually results in a warning, expiring after 90 days if there are no further issues. Optional policy trainings are available. Subsequent violations lead to escalating penalties, including upload restrictions and[ channel termination](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802168). Deleting content doesn't remove a strike, and strikes may be issued on deleted content. Creators can [appeal warnings](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/185111) and [appeal strikes](https://www.youtube.com/features?sts=1), but violations may result in channel restrictions or termination, with attempts to circumvent restrictions leading to further consequences. Familiarizing oneself with [Community Guidelines ](https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/policies/#community-guidelines)is crucial to staying on YouTube. {% embed url="" %} #### [Channel or account terminations](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802168?hl=en) This page features the consequences and procedures associated with the termination of a YouTube channel. It outlines the reasons for terminations, such as repeated violations of [Community Guidelines](https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/policies/#community-guidelines\\), severe abuse, or policy dedication. The prohibition against circumventing termination and the impact on revenue, including withholding unpaid earnings, is emphasized, particularly for participants in the YouTube Partner Program. The article also provides information and a [form to appeal a termination ](https://support.google.com/youtube/contact/accountdisabled?sjid=1063120481668850867-EU)and addresses the process for copyright-related terminations, including the option for a counter-notification. Additionally, it notes the inability to download YouTube content after termination but highlights the ability to [download Google data.](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3024190) # Civil society While you wait for our response please consult some of the resources that are available for you. ## Access Now {% hint style="danger" %} [**Access Now Digital Security Helpline**](https://www.accessnow.org/help/)**:** works with individuals and organizations around the world to keep them safe online. **If you’re at risk, Access Now can help you improve your digital security practices to keep out of harm’s way.** If you’re already under attack, they provide rapid-response emergency assistance. {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} ## ICFJ Digital Security Course The International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), Border Center for Journalists and Bloggers (BCJB) and Meta partnered to create a [free online digital security and safety training course for journalists and human rights defenders](https://www.icfj.org/our-work/strengthening-digital-security-journalists-and-civil-society-advocates). {% hint style="info" %} {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} ## Rory Peck Trust - Resilience Programme Since 2018, Meta has sponsored the Rory Peck Trust, a vital lifeline to freelance journalists reporting from a war zone or the underbelly of a humanitarian or constitutional crisis, giving out over 140 assistance grants in the last year. The Trust provides practical and financial support to freelance journalists and their families worldwide, assisting them in times of crisis and helping them to work more safely and professionally. {% embed url="" %} # Terms of Reference This document describes the mission, scope, terms of engagement and other details of the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM) {% embed url="" %} # Privacy Policy This Privacy Policy aims to provide information about our policies concerning the collection, use, and disclosure of information for those who choose to utilise T\&JM {% embed url="" %} # The problem At the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, major tech platforms didn't have enough information on who the country's and region's local trustworthy voices were. Despite the fact that platforms collaborated with international partners on numerous news trust initiatives and indicators, they lacked reliable mechanisms to identify professional and trusted local news sources in smaller markets. Ukrainian Public Broadcaster and Euromaidan Press, for example, were neither verified on Twitter nor recognised by Facebook as news publishers, whereas [Russia Today continued to earn advertising revenue on Facebook and YouTube until February 2022](https://www.thedrum.com/news/2022/02/28/google-and-meta-block-russian-state-media-monetizing-their-platforms). While technology companies have made significant efforts to combat the spread of dis- and misinformation, very few systems are in place to distinguish credible and trusted content creators, such as high-quality journalists and media organisations. At the time of [SembraMedia's Inflection Point International](https://data2021.sembramedia.org/reportes/executive-summary/) report 62% of the media organisations interviewed [\[1\]](#footnotes) were not verified on Twitter and 64% were not verified on Facebook. Overall, only 35% of the media organisations said they had a point person to speak with in connection to the social platforms. Small and local media, investigative journalism organisations, journalists, NGOs, and other professional content creators [often face prohibitive content moderation practices when reporting on current events and topics of public interest.](https://bird.tools/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ONLINE-INTIMIDATION-CONTROLLING-THE-NARRATIVE-IN-THE-BALKANS.pdf) “The Chilling: A global study of online violence against women journalists” report found that the percentage of women journalists surveyed who reported online violence to Facebook is 39%, Twitter 26%, Instagram 16%. Also, at least 20% of online gendered violence incidents result in physical violence. Furthermore, many news outlets and journalists struggle to effectively protect their accounts, appeal bogus account suspensions, or to quickly restore wrongly removed or restricted content. As they lack recognition, their content and accounts are often negatively affected by the platforms' current moderation systems and malicious actors. Recent [series of articles by Forbidden Stories](https://forbiddenstories.org/case/story-killers/) partners expose the insidious black market for silencing journalists and their stories. There aren't many, easy to access, procedures in place to provide early warnings, an urgent response, or channels for communication in crisis for trusted content and accounts. Without such a mechanism, attacks on journalists will persist and mis- and dis-information will continue to thrive. On the other hand, there are users of digital platforms that enjoy privileges. Recommender systems, or algorithms that enable content moderation, benefit those who have achieved a privileged status or recognition. Facebook's XCheck programme has provided special treatment to celebrities, politicians, and other high-profile users,[ shielding millions of VIP](https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353) users from the company's normal enforcement process. While XCheck grew to at least 5.8 million users by 2020,[ only selected media companies in the most lucrative markets](https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/jan/26/facebook-news-launches-in-uk-following-deals-with-news-outlets) are designated as news publishers on platforms. Finally,[ the majority of content moderation efforts today focus on online speech-related harms and algorithmic moderation of all content](https://www.disinformationindex.org/blog/2021-7-29-want-less-awful-content-stop-focusing-on-content-moderation/), with only sporadic measures looking at affirmative action, safety protection, and online recognition of credible actors and accounts. [Maria Ressa explained it perfectly with a metaphor](https://www.rappler.com/technology/maria-ressa-unesco-conference-2023-algorithms-undermine-right-to-facts/): “When we focus only on content moderation – it’s like there’s a polluted river. We take a glass. We scoop out the water. We clean up the water, and dump it back in the river. However, what we have to do is to go all the way to the factory polluting the river, shut it down, and then resuscitate the river.” # Consultations The process of developing the T\&JM mechanism is multistakeholder and consultative, with the mission of being locally driven and empowering local actors. The first in a series of consultative meetings and gatherings to discuss the initiative's practical implementation, was **organised by the Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD) and the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME), in January 2023 in Riga, Latvia** with a particular focus on the actors and experiences from organisations working in Ukraine and the region, as well as exiled media due to the conflict. During the workshop, participants discussed how the initiative could work in practice: the definition of "recognition," the identification of trusted communities, and existing emergency/crisis protocols. The report and list of participants can be seen [here](broken://pages/UkImYcXCpepfPX1udKna). A second **consultation was held during UNESCO’s Internet for Trust Conference in Paris on 21 February 2023, co-organized by GFMD and UCLA’s Institute for Technology, Law and Policy**, seeking views from a wider range of partners on how the mechanism should be operationalized, how players should be involved, and what the expectations of such a mechanism were. [This report](broken://pages/ZzlQ7pdHOTyg7XtW5M40) presents the key takeaways and findings from the consultation. # Consultation Report - 25 Jan 2023 - Riga, Latvia The first consultative meeting to discuss the initiative's practical implementation, was organised by the Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD) and the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME) ## Key takeaways * Similar issues regarding content and accounts moderation during the conflict have been experienced across different platforms. Language is a challenge in itself, also impacting other regions using Cyrillic or Arabic alphabets as well as other minority languages. * Communication channels with platforms are rarely and inconsistently accessible. * Platforms' responsiveness to content and account moderation issues has been arbitrary, and during crises, often inconsistent and inadequate. * Ad-hoc communication channels are insufficient, not standardised, and not available to everyone, and, when they are available, there is limited opportunity to follow up on issues raised with tech companies. * Joint advocacy is needed to reach out to tech platforms and to improve communication with them, but more important, to establish a system or protocol. * The development of standards and ethical guidelines is needed for credibility and effective communication with tech platforms and policymakers. * The mechanism should be scalable across different regions and within digital platforms, taking into consideration local contexts. Information is valuable for platforms to receive data and new contact points. * A systematised mechanism should be designed with transparency and accountability in mind, including regular follow-ups and updates on the outcomes after an issue is flagged or resolved. ## Issues identified: * Lack of established communication channels and effective notice, appeal, and remedy mechanisms: Content from media outlets and journalists reporting from Ukraine and about events in Ukraine is often removed from platforms without a satisfactory response from official channels for complaints. Although each case is unique, journalism organisations usually had to find ways to contact platform representatives through informal channels, sometimes without success. Accounts or content were frequently restored after 10 days, but the content had already lost most of its value or the account's prominence had suffered. Ad-hoc communication channels are available only to a small number of players, and despite them, there’s little opportunity to follow up on the issues that have been raised with the tech companies. * GDPR and DMCA takedown notices are often used as a pretext to report journalism organisations to platforms and cause removal of content: Content has not only been taken down due to internal policies regarding sensitive content, or blocked because of the mention of certain trigger words that algorithms identified as Russian propaganda, but also because of false claims regarding copyright attributions coming from third parties. * Self censorship and inability to post war- and violence- related content are becoming commonplace for social media editors who are trying to avoid removal of the content or suspension of accounts: Media outlets have to take precautions with what they post, sometimes even rewriting the text or avoiding posting too much content that might risk being potentially blocked (especially photos or videos). Finding an appropriate balance between telling the story and allowing the story to be published on the platforms might lead to self-censorship on certain occasions. Platforms’ moderation policies should not restrict the dissemination of newsworthy content especially in countries at war (i.e., Bucha pictures). * Russian media in exile faced an additional layer of challenges due to Russian restrictions on digital platforms, impacting the functioning of digital advertising. Furthermore, some media outlets were unable to register on platform apps or promote their content online. Russian independent media were facing double censorship: on one side, they were banned in Russia for being opposition media and on the other, they were banned in Europe for being Russian media. * Languages: Language is a challenge for COMO, also impacting other regions using Cyrillic or Arabic alphabets as well as other minority languages.
## Suggested solutions: * Joint advocacy: It is hard for media on their own to reach out to big-tech platforms; however, sometimes, media don’t have the capacity to organise themselves, especially in conflict areas. While some of the interactions at the beginning of the conflict were successful despite the chaotic situation, this needs to be scaled to regular and systematised communications with platforms. * Explore existing mechanisms of tech platforms and how they can be used to better channel cases of journalism organisations: * * [Crisis Policy Protocol](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/policies/improving/crisis-policy-protocol/): Advance of a crisis: develop a baseline understanding of different risk factors in different countries basing that on media freedom index scores, levels of independent press, democracy or similar to identify potential risk. Problems with over enforcement of content, important to continue conversations and a mechanism to identify what has happened, whether it is a flaw on the enforcement or the policy itself. * [Trusted partner programme](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/policies/improving/bringing-local-context/) ー Establish relationships with local/regional civil society organisations predominantly around the world. Ask trusted partners to give us information about what is happening on the ground. Potential expansion of the types of organisations that will be part of the programme. * [Cross-Check programme](https://transparency.fb.com/en-gb/pao-cross-check-policy/): List organisations, individuals, or pages; when their content gets flagged, it will go under a second review by a human to check that it is not a case of over enforcement. The programme has been under review over the last few months, and there will also be a similar programme in which media organisations will be included for a second review. After the invasion of Ukraine some media organisations were also added to that programme. A conversation about how we can use the programme to include independent public interest media, especially in small markets? ## Systematised mechanism recommendations: * Potential actions/solutions by platforms: * **Urgency:** Platforms should be bound to react to major crises and emergencies by addressing over/under moderation issues related to local media in conflict/crisis areas. * **Name recognition:** Sometimes platforms won’t respond to local/regional media but they respond to international organisations. Many of these international organisations have been contacting platforms in parallel. To avoid duplication, streamline communication, and alleviate the burden on all parties, we propose creating a regionally coordinated system/mechanism for verification of accounts. The pilot = EEurope. * **Numbers:** Platforms, which are dealing with huge amounts of information, should be giving priority to find systematic, transparent solutions to avoid having issues that need to be addressed individually. * To give the mechanism some level of transparency and general agreement, consideration should be given to the **development of a set of standards or ethical guidelines, designed by and building on existing frameworks in the community, to which news organisations could be required to adhere if they are to be included in the mechanism.** Such standards and inclusion processes would likely improve the credibility of the mechanism, facilitating more effective responsiveness from and with tech platforms and policymakers. * Scalability should be considered since media and journalists all across the world experience the same censorial issues noted during the session. These issues are exponentially worse in those regions using Cyrillic or Arabic alphabets as well as other under-resourced digital languages. However, local contexts are unique, and from previous initiatives it has been noted that **it is necessary to realistically identify what is achievable for each specific context.** * **Accountability:** Such mechanism should ensure regular follow-ups and updates on the outcomes after an issue has been flagged or resolved by the platforms. * **Database of organisations or communities?**:The system should not decide what is true or not; rather, it should, for example, create an independent media database based on certain criteria, which is not very complex to implement and can be built on at the local level. ## Challenges ahead: * The creation of such a mechanism takes time, and meanwhile, most of the urgent issues remain unaddressed. Instead of reinventing the wheel, existing systems should be built upon, even those systems coming from fact-checkers and the disinformation community. Think of information integrity as a part of the solution to counter disinformation and to counter violent extremism and terrorism online. Other initiatives can inform the mechanism: {% hint style="info" %} * [Access Now Declaration](https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2022/11/Declaration-of-principles-for-content-and-platform-governance-in-times-of-crisis.pdf) * Access Now [Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/): A 24-hour hotline that provides direct assistance and support to those who are victims of cyberattacks or face security threats in the online ecosystem such as journalists, media platforms, and human rights defenders. * [Christchurch Call](https://www.christchurchcall.com/) * [Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT)](https://gifct.org/) * [European Fact Checking Standards Network Project](https://eufactcheckingproject.com/) * JTI, Ads for News, NewsGuard, Trust Project, etc- {% endhint %} - Tech companies might prefer informal structures to address these issues. However, such informal channels often lack transparency and accountability and benefit a small number of privileged players who have access to their communications channels. To overcome this challenge, the mechanism should find an appropriate balance between ensuring transparency and accountability and being easily accessible to and navigable by tech platforms, local journalists, and media organisations and mitigating the potential for abuse. - In general, in many parts of the world, there is an almost arbitrary difference in experience between media organisations and platforms’ responsiveness. Inconsistent and inadequate responses are even more obvious during crises: companies often fail to respect human rights by adopting ineffective mitigating measures that have an adverse impact on human rights protection. No general rule exists to identify which platforms are responsive and which are not, because that depends on the organisation in their context. While a systematised escalation channel could have added value, it needs to be effective in practice by leading to increased responsiveness. - Tech companies operate in different ways and are incentivised in different ways. - International organisations also operate in different ways and often have different standards or criteria for defining who should be considered as journalists or media. The shift should not be only at the platforms’ level but also in the way civil society operates. ## Next steps: {% hint style="info" %} *Define priorities:* Platform’s moderation challenges (transparency, language, algorithmic…) and escalation of issues. False flagging, trolling, cyber-attacks. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} *Which organisations should be involved and how?* The mechanism should involve and be led by local and regional actors. International actors, on the other hand, are better placed to advocate with the global tech platforms for adoption of such a locally- designed protocol and would have a supportive role, focusing more on monitoring and advocating for the creation and proper functioning of the mechanism. {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} Define structure and main elements: Risk Assessment of this approach and type of mechanism. Existing standards and information integrity approaches that could provide a framework or guidance {% endhint %} ## Participants 1. BBC Media Action 2. Hromadske, Ukraine 3. Article 19 4. Reporters sans frontières 5. UCLA 6. Google 7. The Fix 8. Access Now 9. Free Press Unlimited 10. Open Society Foundations 11. International Media Support 12. DW Akademie 13. Meta 14. IREX 15. Lviv Media Forum 16. DT Global 17. Reporters sans frontières # Consultation Report - 21 Feb 2023 - Paris, France The second consultation was held during UNESCO’s Internet for Trust Conference in Paris on 21 February 2023, co-organized by GFMD and UCLA’s Institute for Technology, Law and Policy.
## Key takeaways * In Ukraine and other conflict zones, journalism and media organizations face unique challenges when it comes to content moderation on social media platforms. Social media platforms seem to lack capacity for effectively and promptly dealing with content moderation challenges and media organisations frequently experience delays and a lack of follow-up from platforms after flagging moderation issues. By the time they make decisions, news items become outdated. * Some platforms remove graphic content related to war and potential violations of human rights. Media outlets often practice self-censorship to avoid being banned or to prevent their accounts from being suspended. There is a need to ensure that content about war crimes and human rights violations is not lost. * Navigating these challenges requires a collaborative effort between social media platforms, media organisations, and local actors to establish clear protocols and support for fair and effective content moderation practices. By understanding key actors and sources of information, companies can better respond to crises and ensure that valuable information is preserved. * To effectively address crises, companies should have a cross-functional team that can be work across issues and areas, and are able to work both externally and internally, with the ability to make decisions on both content issues and future directions a crisis may take. * Certifying "content" can be challenging. Therefore, the recommended approach is to focus on the account level, e.g. the media outlet itself and its practices. Ethical Journalism Network (EJN) and Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI) recommend ethical audits to media outlets as a self-assessment procedure to evaluate their ethical standards and governance. They also propose defining a ready-to-use framework as soon as media outlets are in a crisis situation (or even better, in advance). A network of nominating sources, such as national press freedom organizations or councils, should be used to nominate media outlets that should be encompassed in this emergency protocol. However, there was also acknowledgement that crises come in many different shapes and sizes, including prolonged, slow burning ones, so that should be addressed in future iterations, * Participants advocated the development of an early warning system with a multistakeholder approach. This mechanism should be integrated into the UN Plan of Action on Safety of Journalists and its national plans of action, as the problem directly affects press freedom and the safety of journalists. * The mechanism must be data and evidence-driven, especially to support advocacy on social media accountability and facilitate systematic, sustainable collaboration between civil society and tech platforms. ## Issues identified In Ukraine and other conflict zones, journalism and media organisations face unique challenges when it comes to content moderation on social media platforms. The Lviv Media Forum has experienced delays and a lack of follow-up from platforms after flagging moderation issues, indicating a need for clear mechanisms of cooperation and involvement of local actors in responding to content moderation issues. Some platforms prioritise creating a "joyful, happy environment," leading to the removal of graphic content related to war and potential violations of human rights. While platforms lack the capacity to promptly and effectively deal with content moderation challenges, media outlets often practise self-censorship to avoid being banned or to prevent their accounts from being suspended. Evidence preservation and speech suppression were mentioned by several participants. It is necessary to ensure that information about war crimes and human rights violations is preserved. Media organisations also face physical risks, cybersecurity threats, and legal threats linked to their online activities. Frequent trolling campaigns are designed to manipulate algorithmic systems, causing them to automatically remove or suppress content. Trusted Partner programmes exist, but are unevenly and not transparently deployed. A systematic approach is lacking, with issues often addressed on a case-by-case basis. Navigating these challenges requires a collaborative effort between social media platforms, media organisations, and local actors to establish clear protocols and support for fair and effective content moderation practices during crisis. Local communities recognised by international organisations can provide recommendations and validation that media organisations observing ethical and professional standards. ## Lessons learned from existing initiatives There are numerous mechanisms and initiatives in place to deal with content moderating in crises and emergencies. Many of them are focused on countering hate speech and terrorist content online, like the [Christchurch Call](https://www.christchurchcall.com/), which was launched by New Zealand and France; [Terrorist Content Analytics Platform’s (T-CAP)](https://terrorismanalytics.org/policies/crisis-protocol-policy) crisis protocol policy employs an alert system, archives live streams and footage, and trains AI to detect violent terrorist content; the [Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT)](https://gifct.org/) was an initiative founded by tech platforms to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms. Although the focus of these initiatives is narrow and targets a specific type of content, it is still difficult to evaluate their effectiveness. There is a lack of information on their goals, metrics, and benchmarks for success. Claims of success are often based solely on quantitative data, such as the number of takedowns or actions taken against content, provided by companies without access to independent review or audit. The focus on quantitative measures raises questions about the logic behind these mechanisms and whether they are truly effective in addressing the underlying issues. There are also crisis response plans in place for social media platforms such as Twitter, Google, YouTube, and Meta. Another initiative from the private sector is the [Global Alliance for Responsible Media](https://wfanet.org/leadership/garm/about-garm), which focuses on advertising next to problematic content. From the civil society side, [Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/), which provides rapid-response emergency assistance for online attacks (for more details please consult [Annex I](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1eYB_XRE70VR62-b2_JtOVbJ1j_viLcRm-MDi5Zzk6g4/edit#heading=h.edjk8p9f9mte)). ### Discussion ### Emergency and crisis responses Crises can be defined in various ways, including natural disasters. The distinction between a continuing war or an invasion is that they present peaks in communication issues at different times. Issues arising from crises and emergencies are multifaceted, involving various actors in different locations who will influence how information is shared and how people, organisations, and governments share and respond to it. Many existing initiatives have focused on the content side and automated moderation that aims to take the burden off of individuals to review and deal with every single piece of content. Trusted flaggers/partners programs exist to leverage the expertise from the local context. To effectively address crises, companies should have a cross-functional team that can work across issues and areas, and are able to work both externally and internally, with the ability to make decisions on both content issues and future directions a crisis may take. Additionally, in a situation of crisis, the platform's perspective is to understand who the key actors are, where the information comes from, and mitigate [state-aligned information operations](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4192038) since there is little that individual journalists or media outlets can do to mitigate against these. By understanding key actors and sources of information, companies can better respond to crises and ensure that valuable information is preserved. A long-term framework is necessary to address crises, including protocols for the initial crisis and learning from the initial implementation. They need to look at the systemic challenges of individual companies, what is already working, where are the problems.
### Identification of credible and trusted journalism actors Sometimes, the regulation of hate speech and illegal content on platforms goes beyond the capacity of industry mechanisms because these issues stem from structural problems in society such as misogyny, homophobia, or racism. To address this, the Ethical Journalism Network (EJN) recommends ethical audits to media outlets as a self-assessment procedure to evaluate their ethical standards and governance. Smaller media outlets such as fact-checking, non-profit, and younger newsrooms are easier to work with, especially in relation to the [self-assessment program promoted by EJN](https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/self-regulation-and-media-audits). However, certifying "content" can be challenging. Therefore, the approach is to focus on the media outlet itself and its practices. During a crisis, it is difficult for media outlets to help formulate frameworks or mechanisms. To address this, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the [Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI) ](https://www.journalismtrustinitiative.org/)propose [defining a framework](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wicIWsbn-tZ8uA-UMhqlDg-QAHhWSeHQ/view?usp=sharing) in the early stages of a crisis or even before a crisis. All stakeholders involved should agree on the adoption of a ready-to-use framework as soon as media outlets are in a crisis situation. A network of nominating sources, such as national press freedom organizations or councils, could be used to nominate media outlets that should be encompassed in this emergency protocol.
### Establishing a voluntary multistakeholder mechanism [The Chilling](https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000377223), ICFJ and UNESCO report reveals that online violence, which operates at the intersection of disinformation and other forms of hate speech, can be incredibly damaging due to its chilling effect. Among its recommendations, the study advocates for the development of an early warning system with a multistakeholder approach. This mechanism should be integrated into the UN Plan of Action on Safety of Journalists and its national plans of action, as the problem directly affects press freedom and the safety of journalists. The report also calls for the creation of a system that helps to predict, monitor, and ultimately prevent the escalation of online violence to offline harm. Shockingly, 20% of the women journalists interviewed for the report experienced offline attacks, abuse, and harassment that they believed had been seeded online. Platforms are comfortable with outsourcing risk assessments and monitoring of online violence escalation and targeting of journalists to civil society organizations. However, this poses many challenges and is not always efficient. Platforms should be asked to commit and invest more resources in this area. The non-responsiveness of platforms is a problem globally. Data and cases need to be systematically gathered to showcase the scale and depth of the problem. Governments need to be part of the conversation and should create regulatory frameworks to address this issue. The mechanism must be data and evidence-driven, especially to support advocacy on social media accountability and facilitate systematic, sustainable collaboration between civil society and tech platforms.
## Background information The Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD), is launching a multistakeholder mechanism Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM), to establish an escalation channel between tech platforms and independent and public interest media, and community and investigative journalism organisations. After the [first workshop](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sOSFO0KqSqvOZJBHLH9Nx5K7_N8qi2ZHK3b4Cu1RXko/edit?usp=sharing) with local partners in Riga, GFMD and UCLA’s Institute for Technology, Law and Policy co-organised a consultation during UNESCO’s Internet for Trust Conference in Paris in February 2023. The consultation sought views from a wider range of partners on how the mechanism should be operationalized, how different actors should be involved, and what the expectations of such a mechanism were. Based on the findings from the Riga workshop, the consultation emphasised the importance of local news is and a need to protect local news organisations and journalists. They often lack a channel to communicate with platforms when their content or accounts are blocked or removed due to algorithmic decisions, false flagging, trolling or cyber-attacked. In the past, GFMD has been hearing about these same issues from members and partners on a regular basis, particularly in countries with small markets that do not receive a lot of commercial interest from the platforms. Local voices are finding it increasingly difficult to operate in an environment that can often be hostile to smaller players. ### ## Annex I: Existing crisis/emergency response initiatives
| **INITIATIVE** | **LED/FOUNDED BY** | **Brief description** | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Internet Governance Forum ([IGF](https://www.intgovforum.org/en)) | United Nations | The IGF is a global multistakeholder platform that facilitates the discussion of public policy issues pertaining to the Internet. Whereas it is not a crisis/emergency response platform per se, it is a key place to discuss and debate policies in relation to the digital environment. | | Global Network Initiative [(GNI)](https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/about-gni/) | Private Sector, Academia, CSOs | Global Network Initiative aims to protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy rights in the ICT industry by setting a global standard for responsible company decision making and serving as a multistakeholder voice in the face of government restrictions and demands. | | Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism ([GIFCT](https://gifct.org/)) | Private sector | The Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) is an NGO designed to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms. Founded by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube in 2017, the Forum was established to foster technical collaboration among member companies, advance relevant research, and share knowledge with smaller platforms. | | [Christchurch Call](https://www.christchurchcall.com/) and Christchurch Call Advisory Network ([CCAN](https://www.christchurchcall.com/our-community/christchurch-call-advisory-network/)) | Governments | Initiative started by New Zealand and France, set pledges for companies to sign up and for civil society to sign up as supporters through the Advisory Network. | | Terrorist Content Analytics platform crisis protocol policy ([T-CAP](https://terrorismanalytics.org/policies/crisis-protocol-policy)) | United Nations / Governments | Tech Against Terrorism is an initiative launched and supported by the United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED) working with the global tech industry to tackle terrorist use of the internet whilst respecting human rights. With support from Public Safety Canada, Tech Against Terrorism launched the Terrorist Content Analytics Platform (TCAP) to prevent the spread of violent terrorist content and flagging it to content moderation teams. | | Internet referral units |


|

Law enforcement units that are able to refer content to platforms when this violates their terms of services. Little oversight or availability to audit the impact of those referrals.


| | Crisis Protocols by social media platforms | Private Sector |

Twitter: crisis misinformation policy in the context of armed conflict

Google: Crisis response focused on natural disasters, relying on AI driven predictive modelling

Youtube: crisis resource panel where they partner with verified service partners in specific countries or regions. Additionally, the panel has an open forum that anyone can submit through.

Meta: Crisis policy protocol aimed at anticipating risks, also partnering with different stakeholders.


| | Access Now [Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/) | Civil Society |


| | Global Alliance for Responsible Media ([GARM](https://wfanet.org/leadership/garm/about-garm)) | Private sector | Initiative through the World Economic Forum, association with advertisers: set of sixteen categories of problematic content where advertisers do not want their ads to show up next to. |
### ### Annex II: Existing initiatives for identification of trusted journalism actors
| INITIATIVE | LED BY | Brief description | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | [Ads for news](https://www.adsfornews.org/about-us/) | Internews, WAN-IFRA, PubMatic, Group m | Initiative of United for News, a non-profit coalition of global media industry and international brands | | [Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI)](https://rsf.org/en/journalism-trust-initiative) | RSF | International standard for showcasing and promoting trustworthy journalism | | [Global Media Registry](https://www.mom-gmr.org/en/about/gmr/) | Global Media Registry | Social enterprise | | [Ethical Journalism Network (EJN)](https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/who-we-are) | EJN | Coalition of journalists, editors, press owners and media support | | [NewsGuard](https://www.newsguardtech.com/about/team/) |


| Journalism and technology tool that rates the credibility of news and information websites | | [The Trust Project](https://thetrustproject.org/about/) |


| International consortium of news organizations building standards of transparency | | [The Global Disinformation Index](https://www.disinformationindex.org/product) |


| Tool that rates news outlets based on the "probability of disinformation | | Trust.txt |


| Machine-readable text file that news publishers add to their websites to signal their affiliations with other trusted news organizations | \ \
### ## Annex III: Agenda of the Side-Event and participants list ### Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism: Side-Event UNESCO Conference 2023 - 21st February 9:00h | 09:00 to 9:30 | Registration and refreshments | | -------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | 09:30 - 09:50 |

Welcome and introduction of the T\&JM initiative

Mira Milosevic (GFMD)

Courtney Radsch and Michael Karanicolas (ITLP)

| | 09:50 - 10:20 | Experiences of journalism and media organisations in Ukraine and the region | | 10:20 - 10.50 |

Crisis and emergency protocols, escalation channels, and mechanisms for identification and verification

  • What are the lessons learned from recognised international crisis protocols and processes?
  • What are existing avenues of collaboration with platforms and other private sector stakeholders?
  • What are the expectations for crisis/emergency protocols and communication and escalation channels? What are the possible actions that platforms could take with the mechanism in place during a crisis or emergency?
| | 10:50 to 11:15 | Coffee break | | 11:15 to 11:45 |

Processes and criteria for identification of credible and trusted journalism actors online

  • What external references, such as news integrity and trust initiatives, professional and ethical self-regulation bodies, and donor and funder audits, could be used to identify credible and trusted journalism actors online?
  • What should be the minimum requirements for demonstrating adherence to professional and ethical journalistic standards?
| | 11:45 to 12:15 |

Key elements of establishing a voluntary multistakeholder mechanism

  • What stakeholders and communities will be brought together to establish this mechanism? What should the level and scope of participation be for different types of organisations?
  • How can local leadership and ownership be ensured?
  • What role could international organisations play in data collection, monitoring, and advocacy with tech platforms?
  • How can risk assessment, and transparency be best integrated?
| | 12:15 to 12:30 | Next steps: conclusions and recommendations |
## Contributions by: * Olga Myrovych, Chief Executive Officer, Lviv Media Forum, Ukraine * Tetiana Avdeieiva, Project Manager on AI, Digital Security Lab, Ukraine * Courtney Radsch, Fellow UCLA, Institute for Technology, Law & Policy, US * Stephen Turner, former Director of EU Public Policy at Twitter, Belgium * Danica Ilic, Program Specialist, Ethical Journalism Network (EJN), UK * Thibaut Bruttin, Assistant Director General, Reporters Without Borders (RSF), France * Julie Posetti, Deputy Vice President and Global Director of Research, International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), US * Ruth Kronenburg, Executive Director, Free Press Unlimited (FPU), Netherlands
## Attendees (Organisations) 1. ARTICLE 19 2. BBC Media Action 3. Cafeyn 4. Cardiff University 5. Centro de Estudios en Libertad de Expresión y Acceso a la Información (CELE) 6. Center for Media and Information Literacy 7. Center for Law and Democracy 8. CREOpoint 9. Délégation permanente du Royaume du Maroc auprès de l'UNESCO 10. Digital Security Lab 11. EDRi 12. Ethical Journalism Network 13. European Endowment for Democracy 14. Free Press Unlimited 15. Ghana News Agency 16. Global Forum for Media Development 17. Global Media Registry 18. Global Partners Digital 19. Google 20. Islamic World Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ICESCO) 21. International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) 22. International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM) 23. International Media Support 24. Institute for Rebooting Social Media, BKC, Harvard 25. International Press Institute 26. Internews 27. Kaalmo legal Aid Center 28. Lviv Media Forum 29. Maharat Foundation 30. Media Council of Malawi 31. METÏS INNODEV SAS 32. Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services (Zimbawe) 33. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 34. Open Society Foundation (OSF) 35. Meta Oversight Board 36. Permanent Delegation of Türkiye to UNESCO 37. RNW Media 38. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 39. Surfshark 40. Tech 4 Peace 41. Thomson Reuters Foundation 42. Youth Committee on UNESCO Media and Information Alliance # The proposed solution Although some media outlets and journalism organisations have received recognition from the platforms, many others have been left behind. This has been especially true for small, independent, and investigative media outlets in nations and regions that aren't viewed as major tech markets. The invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that the current approach is not only ineffective but also potentially harmful to local media and journalists and overall information spaces online. To address the current bottleneck approach and ensure that credible and professional voices continue to exist and operate freely in digital environments, GFMD proposed a multistakeholder process to establish the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism (T\&JM), starting with the region of Ukraine and the neighbouring countries. **This initiative aims to strengthen content and account moderation systems by establishing an emergency and crisis mechanism for journalists and media organisations to address incidnets and issues related to account moderation on tech platforms. The project specifically targets small and medium-sized media, community and investigative journalism organisations and their professional communities**. The key objective of the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism's (T\&JM) is to engage journalism organisations, civil society, companies, and academics and experts to develop collaboratively: {% hint style="success" %} **Processes and criteria for identification** of credible and trusted journalism organisations online, their communities, and representative groups; {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Crisis and emergency protocols, case escalation criteria, and functioning escalation channels**; {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Key elements and processes for **establishing a voluntary multistakeholder and emergency and crisis mechanism.** {% endhint %} # Literature review Article 19 (2022) [EU: Will the Digital Services Act hold Big Tech to account? - ARTICLE 19](https://www.article19.org/resources/digital-services-act-big-tech-accountable/) (July 05, 2022) Center for Democracy & Technology (2022) CDT Comments to the UK Parliament on the UK Online Safety Bill; June 29, 2022. Available at: Digital Security Lab (2022), Digital Security in the Ukrainian Civil Society Sector during the War (October 14, 2022). Accessible at: Frosio, Giancarlo & Husovec, Martin (2020), Accountability and Responsibility of Online Intermediaries, in Giancarlo Frosio (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability (Oxford University Press, 2020), Available at SSRN: or Granger, Jacob (2022) [Google News Showcase: Is it viable for the smallest of newsrooms?](https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/google-news-showcase-is-it-viable-for-the-smallest-of-newsrooms-/s2/a944419/) Journalism.co.uk; (July 7, 2022) Horwitz, Jeff (2021) [Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents Reveal a Secret Elite That’s Exempt](https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353), The Wall Street Journal, (September 13, 2021) Husovec, Martin, (2021a). (Ir)Responsible Legislature? Speech Risks under the EU’s Rules on Delegated Digital Enforcement (September 17, 2021). Available at SSRN: or Husovec, Martin (2022) Trusted Content Creators. LSE Law - Policy Briefing Paper No. 52, Available at SSRN: or Husovec, Martin & Roche Laguna, Irene (2022) Digital Services Act: A Short Primer, in Martin Husovec and Irene Roche Laguna, Principles of the Digital Services Act (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming 2023), Available at SSRN: or Radsch, C. (July, 2022) Making Big Tech Pay for the News They Use. Washington DC: Center for International Media Assistance. Available at: Ponsford, Dominic (2017) [How the rise of online ads has prompted a 70 per cent cut in journalist numbers at big UK regional dailies](https://pressgazette.co.uk/how-the-rise-of-online-ads-has-prompted-a-70-per-cent-cut-in-journalist-numbers-at-big-uk-regional-dailies/), Press Gazette, (January 24, 2017) Reporters without Borders (2023) Concept note: [The JTI emergency protocol](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wicIWsbn-tZ8uA-UMhqlDg-QAHhWSeHQ/view?usp=sharing) Reporters without Borders (2022) [Ukrainian journalism – collateral victim of Big Tech measures | RSF](https://rsf.org/en/ukrainian-journalism-collateral-victim-big-tech-measures) Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation (2022) [The 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation | Shaping Europe’s digital future](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation), [2022 Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation | Shaping Europe’s digital future](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/2022-strengthened-code-practice-disinformation) (June 16, 2022) Waterson, Jim (2019) [YouTube blocks history teachers uploading archive videos of Hitler](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/06/youtube-blocks-history-teachers-uploading-archive-videos-of-hitler), The Guardian (June 6, 2019) # Frequently Asked Questions Welcome to the T\&JM Frequently Asked Questions page! ## What is the Tech and Journalism Mechanism? The Tech and Journalism Mechanism ([T\&JM](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/)) serves as a communication channel between Ukrainian-based media outlets and social media companies to address and resolve moderation disputes. We accept cases involving systemic moderation issues stemming from various account-related incidents, including but not limited to: * Account removal * Account suspension or blocking * Mislabelling * Deamplification/reduced distribution * Promotion and monetisation restrictions * Repeated content moderation disputes * Impersonation For example, if your media outlet has experienced multiple instances of content removal that you believe do not violate platform standards and terms of use, you can submit a [form](https://form.jotform.com/techandjournalism/english) detailing the content removal issue. Our team will review your report, verify the information with our partners, and determine if your case is eligible. If eligible, we will escalate the matter with the concerned social media company. ## Who can use the Tech and Journalism Mechanism? The T\&JM serves Ukrainian media and journalism outlets that meet the minimum criteria for demonstrating adherence to professional and ethical journalistic standards. T\&JM will vet the identity, authenticity, and compliance with ethical standards or codes of practice of the potential beneficiaries of the mechanism. ## Why can’t media outlets experiencing these challenges outside of Ukraine use the T\&JM? We are currently piloting the T\&JM mechanism in Ukraine as an initial step. We aim to extend its availability to media outlets facing similar challenges outside of Ukraine in the future. ## What cases does the Tech and Journalism Mechanism not cover? The T\&JM aims to address cases of systemic moderation presented previously and will not address the following cases: * Satire * Gender violence * Legal matters * IT issues (redirect) * Security issues * Non-Ukraine-based issues * Individual cases Although we do not cover these cases, we actively work with our partners that may be better suited mechanisms to address the issues you are facing. For security issues, please consult Access Now’s [Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/). ## Who are our partners? The Global Forum for Media Development ([GFMD](https://gfmd.info)) and the Lviv Media Forum ([LMF](https://lvivmediaforum.com/en)) jointly serve as the Secretariat of the T\&JM, coordinating its stakeholders, activities, and administrative tasks. In collaboration with international partners and experts, our initiative brings together a global network of professionals who contribute invaluable expertise and experience. T\&JM [partners and experts](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/coalition-partners-experts/international-partners-and-experts) include: * Daniel Bedoya Arroyo ([Access Now](https://www.accessnow.org/)) * Thibaut Bruttin and Bertrand Mossiat ([Journalism Trust Initiative/](https://rsf.org/en/journalism-trust-initiative)[Reporters Without Borders)](https://rsf.org/en) * Zoey Barthelemy ([Internews](https://internews.org/)) * Bojana Kostic (Consultant) * Ruth Kronenburgh ([Free Press Unlimited](https://www.freepressunlimited.org/)) * Courtney C. Radsch ([Open Markets Institute](https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/)) * Charles Turner ([OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/)) * Elodie Vialle ([Pen America](https://pen.org/)) * Joanna Szymanska ([ARTICLE 19](http://www.article19.org/)) * Michael J. Oghia (Consultant) * Lea Auffarth ([Global Media Registry](https://www.mediaregistry.org/)) * Olaf Steenfadt ([Global Media Registry](https://www.mediaregistry.org/)) Our collaboration with international partners and experts enhances the Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism, bringing diverse global perspectives and valuable contributions to fortify our efforts. ## What are the mechanisms and standards that organisations must comply with? The Tech and Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism’s core values are in-line with or reflective of the following mechanisms and standards for journalism, news media, and technology: * [The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation](https://santaclaraprinciples.org/); * The Human Rights Council Special Rapporteurs’ [2023 Joint Declaration on Media Freedom and Democracy](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/expression/activities/2023-JD-Media-Freedom-and-Democracy.pdf); * UNESCO’s [Windhoek+30 Declaration](https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/windhoek30declaration_wpfd_2021.pdf); * Recommendations from the 2022 report “[Accountability Regimes for Social Networks and Their Users](https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ID_Report-on-Accountability-regime_Sept22.pdf)” published by the Forum on Information and Democracy; * Maria Ressa’s and Dimitry Muratov’s[ 10-point Plan to Address Our Information Crisis](https://peoplevsbig.tech/10-point-plan); * Courtney C. Radsch’s [Understanding and Responding to Global Emerging News Threats](https://internews.org/resource/new-research-by-dr-courtney-radsch-for-internews-sets-out-myriad-pressures-facing-journalists-and-how-they-can-be-tackled/) for Internews & the U.S. State Department; and * ARTICLE 19’s proposed concept of [Social Media Councils.](https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/A19-SMC.pdf) ## What does T\&JM offer? **Direct Support:** Assisting independent journalism and news media organisations in navigating and escalating significant moderation incidents with major tech platforms. **Working Region:** Launching initially in Ukraine with potential for broader application. **Collaborative Framework:** Working in collaboration with Ukrainian organisations, international experts, and the T\&JM Ukraine Coalition, to recognise and assess potential beneficiaries. **Goal:** To have a dedicated platform for trusted and verified journalism organisations and news media to report account-related incidents and ongoing issues with prominent tech platforms. T\&JM will not create a quality standard or assess the quality of the content produced, however, T\&JM will vet the identity, authenticity, and compliance with ethical standards or codes of practice of the potential beneficiaries of the mechanism. **Systematic Change:** Based on the data collected and working with T\&JM Coalition and external organisations and experts, the T\&JM will also act as a collaborative forum to advocate for changes and improvements in platform policies, provide recommendations in the establishment of crisis and emergency protocols, and guide future technical and policy decisions within different Internet governance and policy fora. ## How do cases get monitored? The cases are monitored by the Policy and Advocacy Team at the Global Forum for Media Development ([GFMD](https://gfmd.info)), by examining the cases, verifying the information with a local Ukrainian Coalition, and contacting the social media companies when applicable. We will then follow-up on the case and provide all needed support to reverse the violation or get a justification, when possible. We then contact the user who made the report and update them on its status. Please take into consideration that stopping the violations depends solely on the social media companies’ responsiveness and resources. The companies sometimes don’t respond within the expected timeline and take a late action. However, GFMD is committed to communicating to companies about the violations and developing mechanisms of cooperation and communication with companies in the best interest of social media users. ## Which platforms are you working with? The Tech and Journalism Mechanism (T\&JM) addresses violations across various social media platforms, including Meta (Facebook, Instagram), TikTok, and YouTube. However, it's important to note that our focus is primarily on major social media platforms, and we do not currently address violations on messaging apps such as Signal, Telegram, and others.\ \ While T\&JM may not cover these specific platforms, individuals and media outlets encountering issues on messaging apps are encouraged to explore our [resources page](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/tools-resources/civil-society). There, they can find useful links to other mechanisms and resources that may be relevant to addressing concerns on these platforms. Our aim is to provide comprehensive support and guidance to the extent possible within the scope of our focus. ## How long does it take platforms to address my issue? We are unable to offer a precise timeline for the review process or specify the extent of the platform's involvement in resolving cases. While we've received affirmative feedback from users indicating issue resolution, the user typically receives the first notification of resolution. Nonetheless, given the diverse internal procedures and resource constraints of platforms, we may not be able to disclose every step taken to address your case. ## Does the resolution of my case depend on the nature of my issue? Depending on platform policies and priorities, some may draw more attention to issues concerning systemic issues hindering users’ ability to engage effectively on their platform. Nevertheless, our understanding of platform responsiveness and feedback frequency is consistently evolving. We strive to collect data to discern trends and patterns in the challenges encountered, enhancing our advocacy for the journalism community in Ukraine. ## How can I submit a form? You can submit a form via JotForm through [this link](https://form.jotform.com/techandjournalism/english). The form is available in both [English](https://form.jotform.com/techandjournalism/english) and [Ukrainian](https://form.jotform.com/techandjournalism/ua) to accommodate your preferred language. It's important to note that the form is encrypted for security purposes. While filling it out, we advise users to refrain from including sensitive information. We only share the necessary details with our partners and tech platforms to facilitate the review of your case, ensuring that sensitive information is removed to uphold your privacy. ## Who can access my information? Once you submit a form through Jotform, your information will be stored in GFMD’s database, which we can share with relevant parties to address the issue or with partners to provide support for the case. The information may also be used without indicating any personal information about its original owners for research and advocacy purposes, which are conducted by the T\&JM Team according to GFMD’s [Privacy and Data Sharing Policy.](https://tech-and-journalism-mechanism.gfmd.info/policies/privacy) ## How can media development organisations collaborate with the Tech and Journalism Mechanism in addressing digital rights issues? Media outlets wanting to engage with the Tech and Journalism Mechanism in tackling digital rights issues are invited to contact our [T\&JM team](mailto:techandjournalism@gfmd.info). The ways media outlets can contribute include sharing anonymized data related to these challenges can facilitate research and analysis. Media development organisations can contribute their expertise by providing insights, analysis, and commentary on digital rights issues. This collaboration can enhance the platform's resources and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of challenges faced by journalists and technology users. ## Contact us Address: Rdpt Robert Schuman 6, 1040 Bruxelles Tel: +32 (0)2 720 26 00 Email: \
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# GFMD's digital policy work Background about the digital policy work of the Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD). The core mandate of the Global Forum for Media Development is to promote policies, programmes, strategies, and opportunities for the work of the journalism and media support sector in order to enhance journalism as a public good. We are actively supporting and promoting reputable journalism and civil society organisations on digital platforms as part of our ongoing [work to strengthen digital information ecosystems.](https://strategy.gfmd.info/planning/general-strategy-2021-25/digital-policy-advocacy-2021-2025) We are collaborating with tech platforms' public policy teams to verify the accounts of journalists, news media, and journalism support organisations, particularly those in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. So far, this process has taken the form of ad hoc, informal communication between policy teams at tech platforms and civil society groups like GFMD. Tech & Journalism Crisis and Emergency Mechanism is looking to address this gap.